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Abstract—Covert communication provides high-level security
for protecting users’privacy information. In this paper, we analyze
the joint impact of an external jammer and channel uncertainty
on covert communication in multi-user cognitive radio networks.
Meanwhile, to fairly schedule the covert communication over
multi-user cognitive radio networks, we propose a fairness sec-
ondary user (SU) scheduling scheme, which enables each SU to
have the same probability for sending information covertly with
the aid of an external jammer. Then, the closed-form expression
for the covert rate of the scheduled SU can be obtained. Our
results show that the minimal detection error probability and
covert rate of the scheduled SU can be significantly improved
by exploiting the channel uncertainty and random variation of
interference power. Moreover, the impact of interference power on
the probability of detection error and the covert rate is noticeable
when channel uncertainty is large.
Index Terms—cognitive radio networks, covert communication,
channel uncertainty, covert rate, fairness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio is capable of enhancing spectrum efficiency,
which is emerging as an efficient technique to solve the
scarcity problem of spectrum resources [1]. However, due to
the openness of cognitive radio architecture, cognitive radio is
vulnerable to malicious attacks, such as information disclosure
of cognitive users, eavesdropping etc. Therefore, it is imperative
and vital to study cognitive radio security.
So far, a lot of references have investigated the cognitive
radio security issues from the perspective of the physical layer,
which has been exploited as a supplement to the upper level
security, so as to enhance the security performance of the
cognitive radio systems [2]–[7]. However, it may not always
be enough to rely on physical-layer security techniques. When
the user’s privacy information (e.g., bank account informa-
tion, password, personal medical records) is transmitted over
wireless networks, the user may wish to transmit information
without being detected. Against this background, covert com-
munication is now emerging as a new secure communication
means to provide strong security for users’ privacy information
in recent years. In literature, the impact of various techniques
on covert communication has been proposed and investigated
in wireless networks, including noise uncertainty [8], channel
uncertainty [9], random transmit power [10], etc. It happens
that there is a similar case. It is necessary to protect the privacy
information of cognitive users from detection in cognitive radio
system.
Motivated by this, in this paper, the joint impact of an
external jammer and channel uncertainty on covert transmission
of SU is considered. Moreover, in order to improve fairness and
covertness, a fairness-oriented secondary user (SU) scheduling
scheme in multi-user cognitive radio networks as well as
covert rate of scheduled SU are proposed. Meanwhile, the
minimum probability of detection error and the corresponding
optimum detection threshold for the energy detector can be
obtained by exploiting exhaustive search. Then, we determine
the maximum rate under the covert constraint, namely, covert
rate. Our analysis show that the impact of the transmission
power of jammer on the probability of detection error and the
covert rate is noticeable when channel uncertainty is large.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Considered Scenario and Main Assumptions
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a overlay cognitive radio
network, which consists of one pair of primary users (PU),
one cognitive base station (CBS) and K secondary users
(SUs) denoted as S = fSU1; SU2; :::;SUKg and an external
jammer. Each SU, say SUi (i 2 1; 2; :::;K), attempts to
transmit information to the CBS with a low probability of being
detected by a eavesdropper (Eve). Namely, the SUi wants to
transmit covertly. In this paper, we assume that the system has
only one block of spectrum resources, and PU may transmit
information or not. Each SU independently performs their tasks
to search for the spectrum hole. The CBS selects a SU to
transmit information, and the residual SUs are assumed to
keep silent. Note that prior to each secondary transmission,
the SU scheduling is made at the CBS, which collects all
the sensing results. Throughout this paper, we consider block
fading channels, the channel coefficients remain unchanged in
one block and vary independently over different blocks. Due
to the independence of channel coefficients among blocks, our
work focuses on a certain block. Moreover, the CBS is equipped978-1-7281-4490-0/20/$31.00 © 2020 IEEE
with M antennas and the maximal-ratio combining (MRC) is
considered at CBS to process its received signal, other nodes
here have a single antenna. All the nodes operate in half-
duplex mode. The additive Gaussian real-valued signals from
the SU are denoted by x[n]  N (0; 1), where n = 1; 2:::; N .
The additive Gaussian noise at CBS and the PU, denoted by
nb  N (0; Nb) and np  N (0; Np), respectively. Similarly, we
can also model the noise received at Eve as ne  N (0; Ne).
Fig. 1. Covert communication in secondary networks.
Without loss of generality, considering a SU, say SUi, is
scheduled for transmission, the received signal at CBS and Eve
are, respectively, given by
ybl [n] =
p
Pihsixi[n] +
p
PJhjlxj [n] + nbl ; (1)
ye[n] =
p
Pihse(i)xi[n] +
p
PJhjexj [n] + ne; (2)
where ybl = [yb1 ; yb2 ; :::; ybM ]
T , hsi = [hsi1 ; hsi2 ; :::; hsiM ]
T ,
hjl = [hj1 ; hj2 ; :::; hjM ]
T , nbl = [nb1 ; nb2 ; :::; nbM ]
T , l 2
f1; 2; :::;Mg. hsil and hjl represent the channel coefficients of
links from SUi to the lth antenna of CBS and from jammer
to the lth antenna of CBS, respectively. Meanwhile, hse(i)
represent the channel gain between SUi and Eve, denoted
by hse(i)  N (0; 2se). hje is the channel gain between
jammer and Eve, denoted by hje  N (0; 2je). Since all the
wireless links are modeled as independent Rayleigh fading
channels, the random variables jhsil j2 and jhwej2 (w = s; j)
are exponentially distributed with respective means of 1sil
and
1
we
, respectively. Pi and PJ are the transmission power of
SUi and jammer, respectively, where PJ follows a continuous
uniform distribution with probability density function (PDF)
given by
fPJ (x) =
 1
PmaxJ
; if 0  PJ  PmaxJ
0; otherwise.
(3)
In this paper, we mainly consider the uncertainty of the
wiretap link, the channel coefficient hse(i) is given by [11],
[12]
hse(i) = chse(i) + fhse(i); (4)
where chse(i) and fhse(i) represent the known part and the
uncertain part of hse(i) at Eve, respectively, and they are zero-
mean, independent Gaussian random variables. Accordingly,
the variances of chse(i) and fhse(i) are (1   )2se and 2se,
respectively, where  is a parameter that quantifies the size of
the uncertainty (0<<1).
B. Eve’s Hypothesis Test
In order to detect the presence of covert communications,
Eve must distinguish between the following two hypotheses:
H0 : ye[n] =
p
PJhjexj [n] + ne;
H1 : ye[n] =
p
Pichse(i)xi[n] +pPifhse(i)xi[n]
+
p
PJhjexj [n] + ne:
(5)
Here, H0 denotes the null hypothesis where SUi has not
transmitted signals, while H1 denotes the alternative hypothesis
where SUi has transmitted. We assume that Eve adopts a
radiometer as the detector [13]. The test statistic is given by
T (ye) =
1
N
NX
n=1
jye[n]j2; (6)
Denote the binary decisions that infer whether SU’s trans-
mission is present or not as D1 and D0, respectively. The
false alarm probability and the misdetection probability are
defined as  , Pr(D1jH0) and  , Pr(D0jH1), respectively.
Eve wishes to detect the presence of SU’s transmission and
minimize  = +, the ultimate goal of covert communication
is to guarantee   1   , for an arbitrarily small positive .
Following the widely-adopted assumption in the analysis on
covert communication, we assume Eve can observe an infinite
number of samples [14]. When n!1, we have
(Ne; ) =

0; if Ne + PJ    Ne + PJ + Pi
1; otherwise. (7)
If Ne is known, Eve can set any  2 [Ne + PJ ; Ne + PJ +
Pi] to ensure  ! 0, which implies that Eve can detect the
communication without any error.
III. DETECTION SCHEME AT EVE
From the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) na-
ture of Eves received vector ye, each element of ye has a
distribution given by

N (0; Pijchse(i)j2 + Pijfhse(i)j2 + PJ jhjej2 +Ne);SU tx:
N (0; PJ jhjej2 +Ne); else:
(8)
By application of the Neyman-Pearson criterion, the optimal
approach for Eve to minimize his detection error is to use
the following likelihood ratio test [15]. While adopting a
radiometer, the average power received in a slot, given by
Pe
D1
?
D0
; (9)
where Pe = 1N
PN
n=1 jye[n]j2 is the average power received
at Eve in a slot,  is Eve’s detector threshold. Considering
n ! 1, the average power at Eve in a slot under hypothesis
H0 and H1 are, respectively, given by
Pe(H0) = PJ jhjej2 +Ne; (10)
Pe(H1) = Pijchse(i)j2 + Pijfhse(i)j2 + PJ jhjej2 +Ne; (11)
As per (10) and (11), the false-alarm and missed-detection
probabilities are, respectively, given by
PFA() = Pr
"
(PJ jhjej2 +Ne>)
#
= Pr
"
(PJ jhjej2>  Ne)
#
=

1; <Ne
p1;   Ne
(12)
PMD() = Pr
"
(Pijchse(i)j2 + Pijfhse(i)j2 + PJ jhjej2 +Ne<)#
= Pr
"
(PJ jhjej2<  Ne   Pijchse(i)j2   Pijfhse(i)j2)#
=
(
0; <Ne + Pijchse(i)j2
p2;   Ne + Pijchse(i)j2
(13)
with p1 and p2 being shown as follows
p1 =
Z 1
 Ne
Pmax
J
Z PmaxJ
 Ne
y
1
PmaxJ
je exp( jey)dxdy
= exp
 je(  Ne)
PmaxJ

+
je(  Ne)
PmaxJ
Ei
 je(  Ne)
PmaxJ

;
(14)
p2 =
Z A
Pi
0
(1  p1)fse exp( fsex)dx
= 1  exp
 fseA
Pi

  P
max
J
jePi   fsePmaxJ

h
exp
 fseA
Pi

  exp
 jeA
PmaxJ
i
 
fseje exp

 fseA
Pi

PiPmaxJ
Z A
0
xEi
 jex
PmaxJ

exp
fsex
Pi

dx;
(15)
where je = 1je ,  ese = 1se , A =    Ne   Pijchse(i)j2.
Following (12) and (13), we have
() = PFA() + PMD()
=
8<:
1; <Ne
p1; Ne    Ne + Pijchse(i)j2
p1 + p2; >Ne + Pijchse(i)j2
(16)
To find out the optimal threshold, we consider the following
optimization problem
min

PFA() + PMD(); (17)
Then, we analyze the three possible cases in (16) separately,
and find out the optimal value of  that minimizes ().
a) : <Ne
In this case, () = PFA() + PMD() = 1, which cannot
be minimized.
b) : Ne    Ne + Pijchse(i)j2
In this case, it is known that () is a monotonically
decreasing function of  .
c) : >Ne + Pijchse(i)j2
In this case, we derive the first-order derivative of () with
respect to  as
@()
@
=
@(p1 + p2)
@
=
je
PmaxJ
h
Ei
 je(  Ne)
PmaxJ

  exp
 je(  Ne)
PmaxJ
i
  exp
 je(  Ne)
PmaxJ

+
fse
Pi
exp
 fseA
Pi

 
PmaxJ
jePi   fsePmaxJ
h je
PmaxJ
exp
 jeA
PmaxJ

  fse
Pi
exp
 fseA
Pi
i
+
2fseje
P 2i P
max
J
exp
 fseA
Pi
Z A
0
xEi
 jex
PmaxJ

exp
fsex
Pi

dx
  fseje
PiPmaxJ
exp
 fseA
Pi
h
AEi
 jeA
PmaxJ

exp
fseA
Pi
i
;
(18)
It can be known that () is a quasi-convex function of  and
there is a unique value of  that minimizes (). Then, the
optimum  can be determined by setting (18) to zero. Let  be
the solution. It is known that p1 is a monotonically decreasing
function of  . Hence, the optimum threshold that minimizes
() is . Then, the corresponding minimum detection error
probability ()min at Eve, is given by
()min = 1  exp
 fseA
Pi

  P
max
J
jePi   fsePmaxJ

h
exp
 fseA
Pi

  exp
 jeA
PmaxJ
i
 
fseje exp

 fseA
Pi

PiPmaxJ

Z A
0
xEi
 jex
PmaxJ

exp
fsex
Pi

dx+ exp
 je(  Ne)
PmaxJ

+
je(
  Ne)
PmaxJ
Ei
 je(  Ne)
PmaxJ

:
(19)
where A =   Ne   Pijchse(i)j2.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEDULING SCHEME
A. Sensing at SU
When the PU is in communication, a SU searches for the
spectrum hole by detecting the activity of the PU. Namely, the
SU utilizes the band that the PU does not use to access the
network. Once the PU starts to utilize the band, the SU needs
to switch the frequency band immediately to avoid affecting the
communication of the PU. Therefore, there is no strict limit on
the transmission power of SU, but it is necessary to determine
when SU transmits.
Fig. 2. TS transmitter protocol.
As shown in Fig. 2, we present a time-slotted (TS) [16] trans-
mitter protocol for spectrum sensing and information transmis-
sion. Moreover, every SU observes the radio frequency signals
of PU for a duration of T with the aid of spectrum sensing,
where ( 2 (0; 1)) is referred to as time allocation ratio (TAR)
and T is the duration of spectrum sensing and information
transmit phase. Subsequently, the remaining (1   )T is used
to transmit information to CBS. In this paper, we consider the
non-ideal sensing of the SU, namely, there will be errors in the
SU sensing. In the context of overlay spectrum sharing, false
alarm means that the SU mistakenly determines the existence
of the PU and missed-detection refers to the failure of the SU
to detect the existence of the PU. As indicated by [17], the
detection and false-alarm probabilities may be approximated
as
Pd =
1
2
erfc
 
1p
2
  2m( + 1)p
4m(2 + 1)
!
; (20)
Pf =
1
2
erfc
 
1p
2
  2mp
4m
!
; (21)
Accordingly, the probability of missed-detection is expressed
as
Pm = 1  Pd = 1  1
2
erfc
 
1p
2
  2mp
4m
!
; (22)
where erfc(:) is the complementary error function, m = W
is the time-bandwidth product and W is the bandwidth,  and
 represents the detector decision threshold of the SU and the
received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the PU, respectively. In
order to ensure the quality of sensing, the detection probability
should satisfy with the following inequality
Pd  Pmd; (23)
where Pmd is the minimum detection probability at SU.
We assume that Ph is the probability of PU sending in-
formation and occupying channel h, namely, the channel h is
busy. Accordingly, the probability of channel idle is 1   Ph.
Considering a spectrum band available for the cognitive trans-
mission, Ph = 12 . When the channel is busy, the two cases
are respectively corresponding, that is, the SU detects the PU
and the PU is not detected. The same is true when the channel
is idle. Then, the corresponding probability in each case is as
follows
P =
8>><>>:
Pm; H0
Pd; H1
Pf ; H2
1  Pf ; H3:
(24)
As a result, the SU sends messages only if PU is not detected.
Denote H0 and H3 are the cases that the PU is not detected
when the channel is busy and idle, respectively. Similarly,
denote H1 and H2 are the cases that the PU is detected when
the channel is busy and idle, respectively. Without loss of
generality, consider SUi sending sensing results to the CBS.
Then, the achievable rate from SUi to CBS under H0 and H3
is Rbusy(i) and Rfree(i), given by
Rbusy(i) =
1
2
(1  i)T log2

1 + SNRbusy

(1  Pd(i));
(25)
Rfree(i) =
1
2
(1  i)T log2

1 + SNRfree

(1  Pf (i));
(26)
where SNRbusy =
Pi
PM
l=1 jhsil j2
PJ
PM
l=1 jhjl j2+Nb+Np
, SNRfree =
Pi
PM
l=1 jhsil j2
PJ
PM
l=1 jhjl j2+Nb
, i is the sensing time of the SUi, Pf (i) and
Pd(i) represents the false-alarm and detection probabilities of
the SUi, respectively. As can be seen from the above, Rbusy(i)
tends to 0 when the SU improve their detection probability.
Hence, Rbusy(i) can be ignored.
B. Selection scheme at CBS
Usually, the SUs with good channel gains are more likely to
be selected for transmission, while some SUs with poor channel
gains may have no chance for accessing. In this paper, we
consider the fairness of SU while taking into account the rate.
In our system, it is considered fairness for each SU to have
the same probability of access to the system while ensuring
that the access SU has a certain rate. Hence, we utilize the
unconstrained max-min to qualitatively analyze fairness. Then,
SUi will be scheduled for transmission, by
SUi = arg max
SUi2S
(
min
l=1;2;::;M
 
M jhsil j2
E[jhsil j2]
!)
; (27)
where E() means the expectation operation. Then, we prove
that the proposed scheme is capable of making each SU to
access the licensed spectrum with the same probability.
Theorem 1: The scheme ensures that the probability of
scheduling any SUi 2 S is the same.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume that SUi is
scheduled to transmit information. For notational convenience,
we let XSUi = min
l=1;2;::;M
(
M jhsil j2
E[jhsil j2]
) for SUi 2 S. Then, the
probability P (SUi = SUi) is given by
Pr(SUi = SUi) = Pr
 
\
SUk2S;k 6=i
(XSUi>XSUk)
!
=
Z 1
0
Y
SUk2S;k 6=i
FXSUk (x)  fXSUi (x)dx;
(28)
where fXSUi () and FXSUk () denote the PDF of XSUi and
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of XSUk , respectively.
Then, the CDF of XSUk is given by
FXSUk (x) = 1 
MY
l=1
P (jhskl j2>
E[jhskl j2]x
M
) = 1  exp( x);
(29)
By substituting this result into (28), we can obtain
Pr(SUi = SUi) =
Z 1
0
(1  exp( x))K 1 exp( x)dx = 1
K
;
(30)
where K is the cardinal of the set S. This completes the proof.
We assume that the lth antenna is scheduled. As a result,
the achievable rate of proposed multiuser scheduling scheme
with fairness is given by
CPf =
1
2
(1  i)T log2
 
1 +
Pi jhsil j2
Q+Nb
!
(1  Pf (i));
(31)
where Q = PJ
PM
l=1 jhjl j2, Pi and hsil are the transmission
power of the SUi and the channel from SUi to the l
th antenna
of CBS, respectively. Then, we can obtain the rate subject to a
covert constraint, which is given by
max

CPf ; (32a)
s:t ()min  1  : (32b)
It is known that (32) is of one dimension, which can be solved
by efficient numerical search. Then, the optimal value of P i
that maximizes CPf subject to (32b) can be obtained. Hence,
the maximum covert rate can be achieved by substituting P i
into (32a).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to show the
impact of interference power and channel uncertainty on Eve’s
Fig. 3. ()min versus PmaxJ with different value of , where Pi=10 dB,
2se=0 dB, 
2
je=10 dB, Ne=1.
Fig. 4. ()min versus  with different value of PmaxJ , where Pi=10 dB,
2se=0 dB, 2je=10 dB, Ne=1.
Fig. 5. CPf versus P
max
J with different value of , where 
2
sl=10 dB, 
2
se=0
dB, 2je=0 dB, 
2
jl=0 dB, Ne=Nb=1, =0.3, T=1s, Pf=0.2, M=5, K=10.
detection probability as well as the impact of covertness re-
quirement and interference power on the achievable rate.
Fig. 3 shows the minimum detection error probability
()min versus jammer’s maximum transmit power under
varying . It can be seen that the detection error probability
of Eve increases with the value of . Meanwhile, we also
observe ()min ! 1 when PmaxJ =30 dB. From the above
observations, we can draw the conclusion that the joint impact
of interference power and channel uncertainty on the probabil-
ity of detection error is noticeable.
Fig. 4 shows the minimum detection error probability
()min versus the channel uncertainty under varying the
jammer’s maximum transmit power. It can be seen that the
detection error probability of Eve increases dramatically with
the value of PmaxJ . Moreover, we also observe that the influence
of channel uncertainty on detection error probability is not
remarkable when the jammer’s maximum transmit power grad-
ually increases. In other words, the jamming power dominates
the detection error probability when it increases gradually.
As a result, it is concluded that the channel uncertainty has
remarkably little effect on the detection error probability in
comparison with the jamming power.
Fig. 5 shows the achievable rate CPf versus jammer’s
maximum transmit power under the effect of changing the
covert requirement , under a fixed  = 0:5. Then, for a
fixed channel uncertainty, relaxing  from 0.1 to 0.3 shows
a remarkably increase in the achievable rate. Since increasing
 allows a direct increase in SU’s transmit power. Meanwhile,
it can be concluded that the joint impact of interference power
and covert requirement on the achievable rate is remarkable.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the joint impact of an external
jammer and channel uncertainty on covert communication of
cognitive users in cognitive radio networks. Meanwhile, the
fairness-oriented secondary user scheduling scheme have been
proposed for a multi-user cognitive radio network, with which
each SU owns the same probability for sending information
covertly. Our results have shown that the presence of channel
uncertainty at Eve and an external jammer allows SU to achieve
a certain amount of covertness.
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